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Note
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act: A
Unilateral Solution to a Multilateral
Problem
Anthony D. Todero*
INTRODUCTION
On March 2, 2009, Senator Levin introduced the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act (the “Act”) in the Senate.1 Like its name
implies, the goal of the Act is “[t]o restrict the use of offshore tax
The Obama
havens and abusive tax shelters . . . .”2
Administration fully supports the Act.3 Although the bill is
currently in committee (as of Nov. 1, 2009),4 many speculate
* Anthony D. Todero, M.A., Communication Studies, University of Minnesota, J.D.
Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School. This Note would not be possible
without the support of my partner, Leslie, and my parents, Joseph and Catherine. I
am grateful for all that they have done for me. I would also like to thank Micah
Reyner, Elliot Ginsburg, and the staff of the Minnesota Journal of International Law
for making this a better Note.
1. FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER US LLP, SENATOR LEVIN AND
REPRESENTATIVE DOGGETT INTRODUCE STOP TAX HAVEN ABUSE ACT (2009),
http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2009/mar09/25385.pdf. Representative
Doggett introduced an identical bill (H.R. 1265) in the House of Representatives on
March 3, 2009. Id.
2. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. (2009).
3. Kevin Drawbaugh & Corbett Daly, Obama Administration Backs Congress
Tax Haven Crackdown, REUTERS, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/
politicsNews/idUSTRE52271L20090303 (“We fully support the legislation . . . on
offshore tax centers . . . .”); see also Press Release, Timothy Geithner, U.S. Treasury
Secretary, U.S. Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner Written Testimony House Ways
and Means Committee Hearing—As Prepared for Delivery (Mar. 3, 2009), available
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg47.htm (stating that the Obama
Administration “will propose rules to both reform U.S. corporations’ ability to defer
foreign earnings and deter high income individuals and corporations from using tax
havens to avoid taxation.”).
4. See Govtrack.us: A Civic Project to Track Congress, S.506: Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-506 (last visited Nov.
2, 2009) (describing the legislative history of the bill). Bills introduced in Congress
first go to committees where Senators and Representatives deliberate, investigate,
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that the legislation will pass in the current session.5 In the
event of its passage, the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act will fail to
eliminate tax havens and foreign tax evasion.6 The Act is not
geared toward international cooperation. Instead, it uses a
“name and shame” strategy, which other countries have an
incentive to oppose.7
Fortunately, alternative mechanisms for the exchange of
international tax information exist, such as an international tax
authority with domestic enforcement powers8 or a marketoriented solution that would use cash as consideration for tax
information.9 Both alternatives could improve the exchange of
tax information necessary to enforce U.S. tax laws. These
alternatives take into account the needs of tax haven
jurisdictions and therefore are more likely to promote
international cooperation.10 Rather than place the United
and revise the bills. Then the bills are sent to the floor for general debate. Most
bills do not make it out of committee. Id.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Parts III.B.1–5.
7. The Act refers to targeted tax havens as “foreign secrecy jurisdictions.” See
S. 506 § 101(b). For how the Act defines a “foreign secrecy jurisdiction,” see infra
Part III.B. Other nations’ politicians and bankers do not like the stigma attendant
with the label of “foreign secrecy jurisdiction” because it might scare away reputable
clients. See States of Guernsey, Chief Minister Welcomes G20 Summit Outcome,
http://www.gov.gg/ccm/treasury-and-resources/press-releases/2009/chief-ministerwelcomes-g20-summit-outcome.en?textonly=yes (last visited Nov. 2, 2009) (quoting
Guernsey Chief Minister Lyndon Trott after the island signed thirteen Tax
Information Exchange Agreements: “This puts to bed, once and for all, the myth that
the island of Guernsey is a tax haven . . . . The stigma of tax haven status should be
gone forever.”); Anthony Faiola & Mary Jordan, Tax-Haven Blacklist Stirs Nations:
After G-20 Issues Mandate, Many Rush to Get Off Roll, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2009, at
A7 (giving examples of countries, such as Austria and the Philippines, that promised
to exchange tax information after the G-20 countries unveiled a new “list of shame”).
Moreover, Swiss banks, for example, face the uneasy choice between violating U.S.
law or defying Swiss law’s stringent bank secrecy provisions. See David S.
Hilzenrath, IRS, Justice Target Undisclosed Assets in Swiss Accounts, WASH. POST,
Nov. 1, 2008, at D01 (describing the predicament of Swiss bank UBS in trying to
comply with a U.S. court order that is contrary to Swiss secrecy laws).
8. See ZVI DANIEL ALTMAN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER TAX TREATIES 351
(2005) (explaining that an international mechanism trusted by all treaty partners is
inherently necessary for coordination, but that enforcement, because of sovereignty,
necessitates an international tax institution capable of domestic enforcement).
9. See generally Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax
Information, 49 B.C. L. REV. 605, 658–61 (2008) (discussing the pros and cons of a
more complete market for tax shelter information).
10. See United Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis
and its Impact on Development, New York, June 1–3, 2009, Outcome of United
Nations Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and its Impact on
Development, ¶ 35, available at http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/
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States in the unenviable position of global tax enforcer, an
international tax authority or a more complete market for tax
information would better facilitate the exchange of
extraterritorial tax information and promote U.S. tax
enforcement.
This Note does not consider the entirety of the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act. Instead, the brunt of the criticism is levied at
the Act’s list of tax havens.11 The Act identifies specific
jurisdictions as tax havens;12 mandates heightened scrutiny of
financial transactions conducted in those jurisdictions;13
imposes relaxed evidentiary burdens on prosecutors, in the form
of rebuttable presumptions,14 to make enforcement of tax laws
financialcrisis/outcomedoc.pdf (highlighting the need for inclusive policies that will
allow developing countries to benefit from international tax cooperation); see also
Steven A. Dean, End the Barter System, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 27, 2007, available at
http://www.brooklaw.edu/news/homepage_news/dean_tax_article.pdf
(advocating
compensating cooperative countries with cash rather than bartering for the
exchange of extraterritorial tax information).
11. See generally Brigitte Unger & Joras Ferwerda, Regulating Money
Laundering and Tax Havens: The Role of Blacklisting (Tjalling C. Koopmans
Research Inst. Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 08-12, May 15, 2008), available at
http://www.uu.nl/uupublish/content/08-12.pdf, for more about the strategy of
“naming and shaming” tax havens.
12. See S. 506 § 101(b). According to the initial list in the Act, each of the
following jurisdictions is an offshore secrecy jurisdiction: Anguilla, Antigua and
Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada,
Guernsey/Sark/Alderney, Hong Kong, Isle of Man, Jersey, Latvia, Liechtenstein,
Luxembourg, Malta, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, Samoa, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Singapore, Switzerland, Turks and
Caicos, and Vanuatu. Id. § 101(b).
13. For example, the Act allows more time for investigating transactions
conducted within one of the identified jurisdictions. In the instance of a tax return
for a year in which the taxpayer received money from a financial account located in
an offshore secrecy jurisdiction, “the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court
for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time within 6
years after the return was filed.” See id. § 104(a). The current statute of limitations
on international tax enforcement is three years. I.R.C. § 6501(a) (2006); see also
Press Release, the White House Office of the Press Secretary, Leveling the Playing
Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas
(May 4, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/leveling-the-playingfield-curbing-tax-havens-and-removing-tax-incentives-for-shifting-jobs-overseas/
(proposing to increase the statute of limitations on international tax enforcement to
six years).
14. See S. 506 § 101. The law would amend the Internal Revenue Code by
establishing a rebuttable presumption relating to control (§ 7492(a)) and transfers of
income (§ 7492(b)) against persons who participated in transactions involving
offshore secrecy jurisdictions. For example, the law provides that a U.S. person
exercises control over an entity domiciled in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction if she
has transferred any assets to the entity. The law also would amend 31 U.S.C. §

DO NOT DELETE

244

11/19/2009 9:37 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:1

easier in those jurisdictions; and enacts other provisions all
geared toward boosting the international enforcement of U.S.
tax laws.15 Certain sections of the Act are logical amendments
to the tax code. For example, the Act extends the statute of
limitations for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to assess
taxes on tax returns requiring offshore examinations from three
years to six years.16 Government Accountability Office (GAO)
studies show that offshore examinations take “a median of 500
more calendar days to develop and examine than other
examinations” because of technical complexity and the need to
obtain information from foreign sources.17 The IRS ends some
offshore examinations prematurely or opts not to conduct them
at all, even with evidence of noncompliance, because of the
current three-year statute of limitations.18 It makes sense,
then, to allow the IRS more time to conduct examinations of
offshore transactions. However, the decision to blacklist the
countries whose cooperation is necessary for the IRS to obtain
the necessary information to enforce U.S. tax laws demands
scrutiny and is the focus of this Note.
In light of the acknowledged caveat in scope, this Note
proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the current international
mechanisms (and their limitations) by which the United States
attempts to enforce its tax laws abroad. Part II illuminates the
impetus behind cracking down on tax havens. Specifically, two
recent occurrences—the Liechtenstein and UBS scandals—have
catapulted tax abuse to the forefront of the collective conscience.
Part III takes aim at the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act. This
Note does not take a normative position on the benefits or

5314 (2006) by creating a presumption that any account at a financial institution
domiciled in an offshore secrecy jurisdiction contains the minimum funds necessary
to require a report prescribed by tax law. Id. § 101(d).
15. For a summary of the Act’s various provisions, see Cadwalader,
Wichersham & Taft LLP, Clients & Friends Memo: Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (S.
506 and H.R. 1265), Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client_friend/
030609_StopTaxHavenAbuseAct.pdf.
16. See supra note 13.
17. Tax Compliance: Offshore Financial Activity Creates Enforcement Issues for
IRS: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of
Michael Brostek, Director, Tax Issues, Strategic Issues Team, Government
Accountability Office).
18. Id. (“Because of the 3-year statute of limitations on assessments, the
additional time needed to complete an offshore examination means that IRS
sometimes has to prematurely end offshore examinations and sometimes chooses not
to open them at all, despite evidence of likely noncompliance.”).
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drawbacks of tax havens.19 Rather, it assumes that taxation, as
a mechanism to gather revenues for government programs, is
necessary.20 A legislative attempt to achieve this goal that will
fail in practice is worthy of noting.21 Although increasing
government tax revenue22 is a laudable motivation, the Act does
not take into account foreign actors’ interests. As a result, it is
unlikely to bolster the exchange of tax information, which would
improve IRS enforcement of U.S. tax laws.
Part IV concludes this Note by discussing two alternatives
to the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act’s “name and shame” strategy
of blacklisting tax havens.
A policy of paying cash as
consideration for tax information would be more successful in
eliciting the cooperation of foreign actors, but market failures
and privacy issues are potential concerns. An international tax
institution might take a long time to create because existing
entities, like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
19. Although the term “tax haven” is used frequently, “[t]here is no precise
definition of a tax haven.” JANE G. GRAVELLE, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE
AND
EVASION
2
(2009),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/
R40623_20090709.pdf. I do not use the term in any normative sense, but only in a
descriptive sense to indicate a jurisdiction with few or no taxes, a lack of effective
information sharing, and a lack of transparency. See id. (citing ORG. FOR ECON.
DEV. AND CO-OPERATION, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE
23 (1998)) (describing features of tax havens).
20. The normative argument in favor of the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act
assumes that tax havens are “abusive.” See, e.g., Maria Tihin, Note, The Trouble
with Tax Havens: The Need for New Legislation in Combating the Use of Offshore
Trusts in Abusive Tax Shelters, 41 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 417, 419 (2008)
(focusing on abusive tax shelters and discussing the movement of those shelters to
offshore jurisdictions).
21. The President’s budget request for IRS compliance programs for fiscal year
2010 includes an increase of “$332.2 million for investments in strong compliance
programs . . . .”
Fiscal 2010 Appropriations: Financial Services and General
Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Servs. and General
Government of the S. Appropriations Comm., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of
Douglas H. Shulman, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service). The Act, therefore,
does not come without economic costs. Legislators should hesitate before enacting
the bill if the likelihood of success is low. Moreover, less controversial proposals are
available. In March 2009, shortly after Senator Levin proposed the Act, Senator
Baucus proposed a more modest version of the Act that does not contain a blacklist.
Baucus favors a more targeted approach that would also give the IRS additional
tools to investigate U.S. tax evaders, but would not condemn all offshore tax havens.
See Edward Tanenbaum, Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act Has Broad Implications, INT’L
TAX REV., June 2009, available at http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/includes/
magazine/PRINT.asp?SID=720491&ISS=25409&PUBID=35.
22. See Hearing on Fiscal 2010 Appropriations, supra note 21, at 6 (noting that
new enforcement personnel are expected to generate $2 billion in additional annual
revenue and an estimated $6 billion in indirect revenue based on the deterrent effect
of the new enforcement programs by FY 2012).
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Development (OECD) and the United Nations (U.N.), are not
compelling status quo auspices for an international tax
authority.23 Regardless of the potential counterarguments
against these alternatives, if implemented, both would be more
successful at facilitating the exchange of extraterritorial tax
information than the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act.
I. THE TAX GAP AND CURRENT MECHANISMS OF
EXCHANGING EXTRATERRITORIAL TAX INFORMATION
Globalization has collapsed many previously existing legal
and technological barriers to international capital flows, making
tax evasion easier and tax administration more difficult.24 The
Internal Revenue Service’s international enforcement of U.S.
tax law thus faces daunting challenges.25 The largest obstacle
in administering U.S. tax law in foreign locales is that much of
the information needed to enforce these laws is unavailable.26
The IRS, for example, has difficulty identifying persons outside
of the United States who are taxable as U.S. residents or
citizens.27 The IRS does not cross-check passports against filed
returns to locate those outside the United States who fail to
file.28 Even if the IRS could identify U.S. residents or citizens in
23. See Justin Dabner, To Join the International Tax Cartel or Not? How
Should Asia Respond to the OECD’s Harmful Tax Regimes Project? 11 N.Z. J. TAX’N
L. & POL’Y 299, 302 (2005) (“The lack of a level playing field has become the major
issue confronting the OECD.”); Jonathan Gaskin, Note, Policing the Global
Marketplace: Wielding a Knife in a Gunfight, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 191, 207
(1999) (noting that the U.N. lacks the authority to implement standards on
international tax cooperation).
24. See Nancy Birdsall, Asymmetric Globalization: Global Markets Require
Good Global Politics, BROOKINGS REV., Spring 2003, available at
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2003/spring_development_birdsall.aspx
(noting
that unregulated markets make it easier for taxpayers to evade taxes and more
expensive for countries to enforce their own tax systems).
25. See David R. Tillinghast, Issues of International Tax Enforcement, in THE
CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 38, 39 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004)
(discussing the “prodigious” number of challenges facing the IRS in enforcing U.S.
tax law in foreign jurisdictions).
26. Id. The IRS has domestic capabilities, e.g., the powers to investigate,
summons, and sue, to enforce tax laws but lacks similar powers in foreign
jurisdictions. Id.
27. See generally Hearing on Tax Compliance, supra note 17, at 7–11
(discussing the difficulty the IRS has in collecting tax information from U.S. persons
in foreign jurisdictions).
28. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 39–40 (noting that the IRS has no system
in place to help administrators perform these cross-checks of passports or green
cards against filed returns).

DO NOT DELETE

2010]

11/19/2009 9:37 AM

THE STOP TAX HAVEN ABUSE ACT

247

foreign jurisdictions who failed to file their taxes, in many cases
the IRS has no enforcement mechanism with which to compel
foreign persons to comply.29 Not surprisingly, few foreign
withholding agents properly withhold the required taxes from
their client’s income.30 Moreover, foreign laws, such as bank
secrecy laws, may limit the disclosure of tax information
Largely due to these
necessary for IRS enforcement.31
enforcement difficulties, the United States has a gross tax gap—
“the difference between the aggregate tax liability imposed by
law for a given tax year and the amount of tax that taxpayers
pay voluntarily and timely for that year.”32
In 2005, the IRS estimated that the gross tax gap was
approximately $345 billion.33 Other countries face similar
shortfalls in tax revenues.34 A fairness issue arises when some
29. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 39 (stating that the IRS has “no practical
way to enforce” U.S. tax obligations against foreign persons). In the recent
presidential campaign season, there was a debate about whether or not paying taxes
is patriotic. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, Op-Ed., Palin’s Kind of Patriotism, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at A31. If patriotism is not a factor, i.e., if people are foreign to
the United States, it is logical that foreign persons would ignore U.S. tax laws,
particularly if the IRS had no means of requiring compliance.
30. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 39 (noting that the IRS has had success in
“inducing foreign financial institutions to ‘volunteer’ to act as withholding agents
. . . . It has no practical way to enforce this obligation, however, and few foreign
persons . . . comply.”).
31. For example, Switzerland’s bank secrecy is legendary. Switzerland has a
“reputation for confidentiality that has helped make a small nation in the Alps a
magnet for international deposits.” Hilzenrath, supra note 7, at D3. Generally,
Swiss law limits a bank’s ability to breach client confidentiality. More specifically,
Swiss law affords account holders the chance “to oppose the release of their names
through a judicial process . . . .” Id. See also Prosecutors Focus on Swiss Bank
Accounts, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Nov. 1, 2008, available at http://www.upi.com/
Business_News/2008/11/01/Prosecutors-focus-on-Swiss-bank-accounts/UPI65601225553320/ (noting that “Swiss banks, by law, cannot disclose account holder
information . . . .”).
32. JAMES M. BICKLEY, TAX GAP AND TAX ENFORCEMENT (Cong. Research Serv.
Report No. RL33882, 2007), available at http://wikileaks.org/leak/crs/RL33882.pdf
(citing ALAN PLUMLEY, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PRELIMINARY UPDATE OF THE TAX
YEAR 2001 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX UNDERREPORTING GAP ESTIMATES 15 (2005),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05plumley.pdf).
33. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP
AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 2 (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/tax_gap_report_-final_version.pdf; see also David R. Francis, With
$100 Billion Lost, U.S. Tolerance for Tax Havens Erodes, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 9, 2008, at 15.
34. For example, the United Kingdom’s (UK) public finances are short billions
of pounds because some of the country’s biggest corporations have complex, opaque,
albeit legal tax schemes by which they avoid paying taxes to the exchequer. UKbased Diageo, which owns Johnnie Walker and Gilbey’s gin, “[d]espite average
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people pay the taxes required by law and others do not.
Furthermore, if noncompliance goes unpunished, there is an
added incentive to those who ordinarily comply to stop paying
taxes, resulting in “a vicious cycle of increased
noncompliance.”35
A. SOURCES OF THE TAX GAP
Individual income taxes constitute the majority of the U.S.
gross tax gap.36 Unreported or underreported income account
for the bulk of these unpaid taxes.37 Estimates of the annual
costs of offshore tax abuses are as high as $100 billion per year,
although accurate estimates of individual tax avoidance38 are
more difficult than estimates of corporate tax avoidance.39
Transparency
International
France
estimated
that
approximately $10 trillion U.S. dollars, or over four times the
amount of France’s gross domestic product, are located in secret
offshore accounts.40
profits of £2 bn a year . . . paid an average of £43m a year in UK tax – little more
than 2% of its overall profits.” Firms’ Secret Tax Avoidance Schemes Cost UK
billions: Investigation into the Complex and Confidential World of Tax, GUARDIAN
(London), Feb. 2, 2009, at 1. Germany also has a significant problem collecting
taxes, as thousands of Germans shelter funds from taxes in the Alpine country of
Liechtenstein. Id. at 3.
35. The Causes of and Solutions to the Federal Tax Gap: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 1 (2006) (written statement of Nina E. Olson,
National Taxpayer Advocate), available at http://budget.senate.gov/republican/
hearingarchive/testimonies/2006/NinaOlsenTestimony.pdf.
Taxpayers who meet
their own obligations but witness others’ noncompliance go unpunished might feel
like “chumps.” Id.
36. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 33, at 3 (finding that individual
income taxes represent more than 50% of the tax gap); see also JASON FURMAN,
Closing the Tax Gap, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 10,
2006, 1–2, http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-10-06tax3.pdf (noting that $244 billion of the
$345 billion tax gap comes from individual income taxes).
37. FURMAN, supra note 36, at 2.
38. The distinction between “tax avoidance” and “tax evasion” is unclear. See
GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that avoidance sometimes refers “to a legal
reduction in taxes, while evasion refers to tax reductions that are illegal . . . .”).
Most international tax reductions by individuals reflect evasion. Id.
39. See GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at 21 (indicating that there are no official
estimates of individual tax evasion, and that estimates of individual evasion, as
opposed to corporate evasion, are difficult “because the initial basis of the estimate is
the amount of assets held abroad whose income is not reported to the tax
authorities.”).
40. Clea Caulcutt, France, Germany push for tax haven blacklist,
FRANCE24.COM, Oct. 21, 2008, http://www.france24.com/en/20081021-world-leadingeconomies-tackle-tax-havens-oecd-france-germany.
France’s estimated GDP for
2008 was $2.128 trillion. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK
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B. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
Bilateral tax information exchange is the main tool by
which the IRS gathers extraterritorial tax information.41 Using
this mechanism, a nation enters into an agreement with another
nation that requires both nations’ tax authorities to provide
relevant tax information to the other nation upon request.42
Bilateral tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs) are
increasing in number.43 Estimates put the number of bilateral
tax treaties at greater than 1700.44 These agreements find their
roots in the model taxation treaties created by the League of
Nations in 1927.45 In 1927, states recognized that bilateral
treaties, rather than multilateral conventions, would be more
effective in dealing with the international tax evasion problem
because fundamental differences in fiscal systems would make
multilateral agreements difficult to conclude without intruding
on national sovereignty.46
There are, however, problems regarding the effectiveness of
bilateral tax agreements. In order to request information about
a foreign person located outside U.S. territory who has failed to
(2008), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/
fr.html.
41. See Dean, supra note 9, at 608 (discussing the current barter system by
which countries exchange tax information for tax information).
42. See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Dep’t, United States Model Income Tax Convention,
art. 26 (2006), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hp16801.pdf
(describing the process of exchanging international tax information in order to carry
out domestic laws).
43. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX CO-OPERATION: TOWARDS A
LEVEL PLAYING FIELD—2007 ASSESSMENT BY THE GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION 9
(2007) (The OECD, referring to eighty-six countries, noted that “[s]ince 31 December
2005, 86 new DTCs [double taxation conventions] have entered into
force . . . resulting in a total of 1814 DTCs in force . . . .”).
44. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate
Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1357, 1358 (2001) (referring to the 1920s as the decade in which countries created
the system of international income tax enforcement mechanisms that has served as
the “basis for more than 1700 bilateral income tax treaties now in force throughout
the world.”).
45. See Dean, supra note 9, at 609 (“The roots of today’s extraterritorial tax
information acquisition system can be traced back to . . . the foundational 1927
League of Nations report on international taxation.”).
46. See Reports Presented by the Comm. of Technical Experts on Double
Taxation and Tax Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.216M.85 1927 II, at 23 (1927),
available
at
http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/tad/Documents/League/
League_Tech_Experts.pdf (noting that the Committee realized that a major risk of
the Convention was “appearing in some quarters as an extension beyond national
frontiers of an organised system of fiscal inquisition.”).
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pay taxes, the IRS must establish the identity of the taxpayer
The IRS must also
under investigation in advance.47
demonstrate that it has exhausted all the available means by
which it could have obtained the necessary information
domestically.48 Another problem with bilateral treaties is that
they often do not yield the necessary tax information in a
particular case.49 For example, most of the agreements that the
United States has in place are limited to criminal matters,
which constitute a minor portion of overall tax revenues.50 In
the event the IRS does obtain information via bilateral exchange
agreements, the exchange of “bulk taxpayer information”51 and
the trade of personally sensitive information52 raise profound
privacy issues. In one sense, bilateral agreements do not
provide enough useful information. In another sense, the
exchange of bulk information provides too much sensitive
information.
Although bilateral agreements may seem preferable to a
multilateral tax treaty in that they more easily accommodate
differences in countries’ tax systems, this rationale does not
47. See GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at 20. The agreements do not override bank
secrecy laws, making it difficult to identify potential tax evaders.
48. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 42 (noting the “legal and practical
impediments to the use of these [exchange-of-information] agreements.”).
49. The United States might not have agreements in place, as bilateral
agreements often exclude developing countries. See Markus Meinzer et al., Tax
Information Exchange Arrangements 3 (2009), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/
upload/pdf/TJN_0903_Exchange_of_Info_Briefing_draft.pdf (noting that “TIEAs do
not work for developing countries” because developing countries have little leverage
and are unlikely to benefit from these agreements). Furthermore, the countries with
which the United States has an exchange agreement may have little to no tax
information of use. See id. at 4 (arguing that TIEAs are ineffective when the
“information simply does not exist in the jurisdiction concerned . . . .”).
50. See Hearing on Banking Secrecy Practices and Wealthy American
Taxpayers Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Irwin I.
Cohn Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=7646 (noting that
“most of the existing agreements are restricted only to criminal matters” and that
these represent a “very small part of overall tax collections . . . .”).
51. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMM. ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, MANUAL
ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION PROVISIONS FOR TAX
PURPOSES, MODULE 3 ON AUTOMATIC (OR ROUTINE) EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ¶¶
1–4 (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/23/36647823.pdf (noting
that some tax information is exchanged automatically by law).
52. See Cynthia Blum, Sharing Bank Deposit Information with Other
Countries: Should Tax Compliance or Privacy Claims Prevail?, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 579,
623–33 (2004) (discussing the privacy claims on bank information by foreigners with
U.S. bank accounts and U.S. citizens with offshore bank accounts).
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withstand scrutiny. First, the IRS needs tax information from
countries with radically different tax systems than the United
States.53 As a result, bilateral tax treaties do not necessarily
solve the problem of gathering the necessary information for
IRS enforcement of U.S. tax laws. The Bahamas, for example,
do not levy taxes on personal income, capital gains, corporate
earnings, dividends, or sales54 and thus may not have the
information the United States needs to enforce U.S. tax laws if a
bilateral treaty was in effect between the two countries. Second,
countries from which the United States needs information to
enforce its tax laws may not have an agreement in place for the
exchange of information. For example, the Bahamas do not
have a bilateral tax treaty with the United States, so the U.S.
has no means of obtaining even the limited information that is
available.55 Third, with the already large number of tax
agreements, conducting future bilateral agreements may add
unnecessary complexity, making enforcement more, not less,
difficult.56 Finally, even if compelling arguments for bilateral
tax agreements exist, they do not necessitate foregoing
multilateral agreements.57
53. See Gregory Rawlings, Responsive Regulation, Multilateralism, Bilateral
Tax Treaties, and the Continuing Appeal of Offshore Finance Centres 16 (Ctr. for Tax
Sys. Integrity, Working Paper No. 74, 2005), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/
publications/WP/74.pdf (explaining that because “tax regulation was never
internationalised by way of a multilateral agreement,” multinational companies
“could take advantage of diversity in types, rates and definitions of tax” in different
national regimes).
54. Raymond T. Gibson, The Bahamas – The Tax-Free Alternative to Florida,
VAULT MAG., Sept. 2002, available at http://www.henleyglobal.com/fileadmin/pdfs/
media-events/articles/bahamas2002.pdf.
55. Despite the existence of hundreds of bilateral tax exchange agreements, the
United States does not have agreements in place with many countries from which
the United States needs tax information. As of April 2009, the United States had
tax treaties in place with only fifty-seven countries. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, U.S. TAX TREATIES (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/
p901.pdf. Of the thirty-four jurisdictions listed as foreign secrecy jurisdictions in the
Act, only five—Barbados, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, and Switzerland—currently
have bilateral tax treaties in place with the United States. Id.
56. See Rawlings, supra note 53, at 7–8 (noting that the current international
tax regulation scheme is not homogenous; instead, there are many competing
regulatory orders that both intersect and diverge at vital moments). Although the
regulatory agendas of various bodies (e.g., the IRS and the OECD) do converge at
points, they are likely to diverge from each other as well as from the agenda of a tax
authority in an offshore financial center. Id.
57. But see Haruhiko Kuroda, Japan’s former Vice Minister of Fin. for Int’l
Affairs, Keynote Address at the First International Convention of the Asia-Oceania
Tax Consultants Association: Economic Integration and Tax Harmonization in Asia
and Oceania (Nov. 6, 2002), available at http://www.mof.go.jp/english/if/
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C. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS
There have been numerous attempts to deal with the
problem of international tax evasion on a multilateral level.
The OECD, the European Union, the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and the U.N. have all sought ways to spur
international cooperation in tax administration by improving
transparency or stimulating new exchange agreements.58 The
OECD, for example, established criteria for identifying member
countries with preferential tax regimes, identified jurisdictions
as “tax havens” if they met certain criteria,59 and proposed new
methods of cooperation with non-member countries.60 The 2000
OECD Report identified thirty-five jurisdictions that might have
been functioning as offshore tax havens. It required those
jurisdictions to express a commitment to cooperate by 2005 and
threatened to apply sanctions if the jurisdictions did not express
commitment before July 31, 2001.61 The U.N. Financial Action
vmi021106e.htm (suggesting that bilateral tax treaties may need to be integrated
into a multilateral one to harmonize taxation).
58. See generally Gianluca Pirozzi, Tax Havens and Relations with
Industrialized Countries, COSMOPOLIS, Feb. 2007, at 1–3, http://agora.qc.ca/
cosmopolis.nsf/articles/no2007_2_tax_havens_and_relations_with_industrialized_cou
nt?opendocument (stressing the need to broaden the efforts to stymie tax evasion to
include the concerns of poorer countries).
59. The OECD identified a tax haven by using four key factors: (1) “no or only
nominal taxes (generally or in special circumstances);” (2) “laws or administrative
practices which prevent the effective exchange of relevant information with other
governments on taxpayers benefiting from the low or no tax jurisdiction;” (3) “lack of
transparency;” and (4) “the absence of any requirement for substantial activity.” See
generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998) available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/
1904176.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 1998]; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL COUNCIL
MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS: PROGRESS
IN IDENTIFYING AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf [hereinafter OECD, 2000]; ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES:
THE 2001 PROGRESS REPORT (2001), available at http:www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/
2664438.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE OECD’S PROJECT ON
HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: THE 2004 PROGRESS REPORT (2004), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/33/30901115.pdf; see also Michael Littlewood, Tax
Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 411, 422 (2005) (highlighting
how key terms such as “low” and “nominal” were undefined).
60. OECD, 2000, supra note 59, at 6 (noting the positive initial reaction to the
OECD project on cooperation to remedy tax evasion).
61. Bruce Zagaris, Ethical Issues in Offshore Planning, 17 A.L.I. PROC. 365,
391
(2008),
http://files.ali-aba.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoobesruoc/pdf/
CP017_chapter_07_thumb.pdf (noting that today, “five offshore financial centers—
Andorra, Liberia, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands, and Monaco—have refused
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Task Force (FATF) also released a report in 2000 on “noncooperative countries or territories (NCCTs).”62 The critical
enforcement mechanism of the FATF is Recommendation 21
that provides:
Financial institutions should give special attention to business
relationships and transactions with persons, including companies and
financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently
apply the FATF Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have
no apparent economic or visible purpose, their background and
purpose, should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings
established in writing, and be available to help competent authorities.
Where such a country continues not to apply or insufficiently applies
the FATF Recommendations, countries should be able to apply the
appropriate countermeasures.63

The FATF recommends regulations and monitoring to
ensure compliance,64 but leaves it to individual jurisdictions to
determine which countermeasures to apply in specific instances
The FATF is not a legal entity, so its
of tax abuse.65
recommendations are not binding on governments or on the
The IMF, however, adopted the FATF
private sector.66
recommendations in devising its review procedure to assess
compliance with international anti-money laundering laws.67
Furthermore, section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorizes
the U.S. executive branch to monitor, regulate, and enforce
countermeasures against “jurisdictions, financial institutions, or
international transactions of primary money laundering
[to express a formal commitment to cooperate]”).
62. Id. at 373 (noting that the FATF identified hindrances to money laundering
prevention and detection, released the results of judicial inquiries regarding the
same, and that FATF members agreed on a process for identifying NCCTs and
international methods to incentivize compliance).
63. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE ON MONEY LAUNDERING, THE FORTY
RECOMMENDATIONS 7 (2003), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/
34849567.pdf.
64. Id.
65. See Zagaris, supra note 61, at 374 (noting that countermeasures may
include not processing certain transactions or reporting transactions to tax
authorities).
66. See Zagaris, supra note 61 at 375.
67. Zagaris, supra note 61 at 375; cf. Kern Alexander, Global Financial
Standard Setting, The G10 Committees, and International Economic Law, 34
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 861, 877 (2009) (noting that the FATF has played a prominent
role in international regulatory standard setting, but also noting that “[i]n recent
years, however, the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors have attracted much more policy
attention since their standards have been recognized by the IMF and World Bank as
international benchmarks . . . for compliance . . . .”).
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concern.”68 Therefore, although FATF recommendations are not
legally binding, they carry considerable force.
1. Criticisms of Multilateral Approaches
Commentators have levied assaults at the OECD’s
campaign against preferential tax regimes as being too onesided and unfair to non-OECD members.69 A U.N. panel’s
recommendation to establish an international tax organization
under the auspices of the United Nations,70 has similarly
received a lukewarm response.71 Although a “World Tax
Organization”72 could remedy the patchwork of bilateral
treaties, and such an authority would have the power to compel
compliance and punish malfeasance, “there is no international
organization that appears capable of serving as the linchpin of
such a regime.”73
II. THE CURRENT IMPETUS DRIVING THE CRACKDOWN
ON TAX HAVENS
Although tax havens are not a new phenomenon,74 they
have grown recently because financial deregulation and
globalization promote the international transfer of capital.75
68. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 311, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(A) (2008).
69. See, e.g., Littlewood, supra note 59, at 442–49 (reasoning that countries
operate preferential tax regimes because doing so is in their economic interest); see
also Pirozzi, supra note 58, at 3 (noting that “by asking them [weak-poor
jurisdictions] to act ‘cooperatively’ and ‘openly’—the high taxation regimes . . .
maintain their privileges and their power . . . .”).
70. See ERNESTO ZEDILLO, TECHNICAL REPORT OF THE HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON
FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT 27–28 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/reports/
financing/full_report.pdf (describing the functions and benefits of creating an
international tax organization).
71. See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, Radical U.N. Tax Plans Threaten America,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, Dec. 18, 2003, http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/
ed121803b.cfm (arguing that governments with free market systems, such as the
United States, would be a target for persecution).
72. See Vito Tanzi, Is There a Need for a World Tax Organization?, in THE
ECONOMICS OF GLOBALIZATION: POLICY PERSPECTIVES FROM PUBLIC ECONOMICS 173,
173–86 (Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka eds., 1999) (lamenting that domestic
legislators cannot keep pace with recent technological developments in financial
markets).
73. Dean, supra note 9, at 663.
74. See, e.g., Pirozzi, supra note 58, at 5 (noting that during the nineteenth
century, some territories, currently labeled as tax havens, were harbors of refuge
where ships could shelter from pirates and foul weather).
75. See Birdsall, supra note 24 (noting that open, unregulated markets make
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Besides the obvious motive to boost government coffers in a time
of economic straits,76 there are multiple factors driving the
Financial
initiatives77 to stem the tide of tax evasion.
liberalization generally leads to increased economic instability,78
because large amounts of capital flow easily into and out of
jurisdictions.79 Furthermore, the attacks of September 11, 2001
highlighted the use of tax havens to finance international
terrorism.80 More recently, global tax scandals erupted in
February and May of 2008: the Lichtenstein and UBS scandals,
respectively.81

tax evasion easier); see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 50 (highlighting that while the
ability to move capital, goods, and services has increased dramatically, tax
administrators’ tools to combat tax evasion have not changed substantially).
76. See Press Release, Senator Levin, Statement of Senator Carl Levin on
Introducing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act (Mar. 2, 2009), http://levin.senate.gov/
newsroom/release.cfm?id=308945 (“I’m introducing the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act
. . . to stop tax cheats who drain our treasury of funds needed to pay for our
recovery.”).
77. The OECD and the G-20 have both recently targeted tax haven countries.
See William Boston, G-20 Leaders to Target Nations Harboring Tax Dodgers,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 30, 2009, at 6; David Crawford, OECD Compiles List
of Alleged Tax Havens for G-20, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB123733504461563913.html. In addition to the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, there
are other legislative proposals including draft proposals by the Senate Finance
Committee, two related bills, S. 386 and S. 569, and a proposal by President Obama.
See GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at Summary.
78. See Robert Kuttner, The Bubble Economy: The Sub-prime Mess, the Huge
Risks Taken by Hedge Funds, and the Conflicts of Interest that Led to Enron Are All
the Consequences of Serial Bouts of Financial Deregulation. Will We Reverse Field in
Time to Prevent Another 1929?, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=the_bubble_economy (noting how the
Glass-Steagall Act, which tightly regulated commercial banks, was weakened
throughout the eighties until it was outright repealed in 1999).
79. See Sol Picciotto, Tackling Tax Havens and ‘Offshore’ Finance, TRANSNAT’L
INST. 1–2, June 12–13, 2007, http://www.tni.org/crime-docs/picciotto.pdf (citing
attempts to improve coordination of international financial regulation to protect
against this systemic risk).
80. Sidney Weintraub, Disrupting the Financing of Terrorism, WASH. Q.,
Winter 2002, at 53, 56 (2002) (noting that tax havens are largely used by “tax
evaders, criminals, and money launderers”).
81. A disgruntled bank employee in Liechtenstein provided German tax
authorities with tax information regarding approximately 1400 persons. See STAFF
OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., TAX HAVEN BANKS
AND U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE 2 (Comm. Print 2008). For more on the UBS scandal, see
infra Part II.A.2.
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A. TWO RECENT SCANDALS
1. The Liechtenstein Scandal
German tax authorities, armed with the names of six
hundred to seven hundred German taxpayers who were using
Liechtenstein accounts to evade paying the comparatively high
German tax rates, executed search warrants and arrested a
prominent businessman for evading $1.46 million in taxes.82
Shortly thereafter, the IRS initiated enforcement action against
more than one hundred taxpayers who also had accounts in
Liechtenstein banks.83 Approximately one dozen countries have
announced a commitment to investigate potential tax evaders
with accounts in Liechtenstein banks, evidencing the global
scope of the scandal and the increased determination of
countries to crack down on tax evaders.84
2.

The UBS Scandal

A second worldwide tax scandal flared when the United
States arrested a former UBS AG (one of the world’s largest
banks) employee on conspiracy charges involving defrauding the
IRS of $200 million in unpaid taxes on assets in Switzerland
and Lichtenstein worth approximately $7.26 billion.85 The
former UBS senior banker pled guilty in June of 2008 to

82. Carter Dougherty & Mark Lander, Tax Scandal in Germany Fans
Complaints of Inequity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2008, at C1 (reporting that the scandal
“brought down one of Germany’s most powerful business figures, Klaus Zumwinkel,
who resigned . . . as the chief executive of the German postal service after the police
raided his home.”).
83. IRS News Release, IRS and Tax Treaty Partners Target Liechtenstein
Accounts 1 (Feb. 26, 2008) (“The Internal Revenue Service is initiating enforcement
action involving more than 100 U.S. taxpayers to ensure proper income reporting
and tax payment in connection with accounts in Liechtenstein.”).
84. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 81,
at 2 (“The national tax administrations of Australia, Canada, France, Italy, New
Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States of America, all member
countries of the OECD’s Forum on Tax Administration (FTA), are working together
following revelations that Liechtenstein accounts are being used for tax avoidance
and evasion.”).
85. Nick Mathiason, Tax scandal leaves Swiss giant reeling: UBS could lose its
licence in America after an official confessed to illicit tactics that helped clients avoid
the Revenue, OBSERVER, June 29, 2008, at Business & Media, 4, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jun/29/ubs.banking (noting that Birkenfeld
confessed to hiding diamonds in tubes of toothpaste and intentionally destroying
offshore bank records).
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conspiracy to defraud the IRS.86 The Department of Justice
detained the U.S. citizen’s Swiss co-conspirator, Martin Liechti,
as a “material witness” to the investigation.87 This enforcement
action is unprecedented, representing the first time the United
States has initiated criminal charges against a Swiss banker for
helping a U.S. taxpayer evade taxes.88 On June 30, 2008, the
United States filed a petition with the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida for permission to “file an IRS
administrative summons with UBS asking the bank to disclose
the names of all of its U.S. clients who have opened accounts in
Switzerland, but for which the bank has not filed forms with the
IRS disclosing the Swiss accounts.”89 The Court approved
service of the summons and the IRS served the summons in
July of 2008.90 The case ultimately settled, as the U.S.
Department of Justice deferred prosecution of UBS in exchange
for UBS paying $780 million and agreeing to cease its crossborder business in entities not registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.91 As part of the settlement, the
86. See Statement of Facts at 1, United States v. Birkenfeld, No. 08-CR-60099ZLOCH (S.D. Fla. 2008). U.S. District Judge William Zloch ultimately sentenced
Birkenfeld to forty months in prison. Kevin McCoy, U.S. officials indict 2 Swiss
citizens in UBS case, USA TODAY, Aug. 21, 2009, at B1.
87. Sean Farrell, UBS Plans to Shed 5,500 Jobs Amid Market Turmoil, INDEP.,
May 7, 2008, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ubsplans-to-shed-5500-jobs-amid-market-turmoil-822233.html.
88. Judge Alfred J. Lechner Jr. sentenced John Mathewson, the owner and
executive of an offshore bank in the Cayman Islands, to only five years of probation,
five hundred hours of community service, and a $30,000 fine because Mathewson’s
cooperation with tax authorities led to an unequaled number of leniency pleas. See
Ronald Smothers, In Plea Deal, Banker Outlines Money Laundering in Caymans,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1999, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/03/us/
in-plea-deal-a-banker-outlines-money-laundering-in-caymans.html.
89. Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons at 1, Case No.
08-21864-MC-LENARD/GARBER (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2008) (asking UBS for the
names of U.S. clients for whom UBS “(1) did not have in its possession Forms W-9
executed by such United States taxpayers, and (2) had not filed timely and accurate
Forms 1099 naming such United States taxpayers and reporting to United States
taxing authorities all reportable payments made to such United States taxpayers.”).
This petition for leave to serve summons is authorized under 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f),
which requires court approval for an IRS administrative summons that does not
identify that taxpayer’s name under investigation. See STAFF OF S. PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 81 at 3.
90. See Carrick Mollenkamp, Behind UBS Case, A Dogged IRS: For Messrs.
McDougal and Reeves, ‘It’s Just a Matter of Detective Work’, WALL ST. J., July 14,
2009, at C1.
91. Press Release, UBS, UBS Settles US Cross-Border Case with the US
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
(Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.ubs.com/1/e/about/newsalert?newsId=162297.
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Swiss government agreed to give the names of 4,450 U.S.
citizens suspected of using secret Swiss accounts at UBS to
evade taxes.92 The summons was the first attempt by the
United States to “pierce Swiss bank secrecy by compelling a
Swiss bank to name its U.S. clients.”93
III. U.S. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE: THE STOP TAX
HAVEN ABUSE ACT
In 2007 Senators Barack Obama (D) of Illinois, Carl Levin
(D) of Michigan, and Norm Coleman (R) of Minnesota sponsored
the Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act,94 but the legislation languished
in committee.95 Some analysts cite the political power of big
commercial banks, such as Citigroup, as the reason why the
United States has not previously clamped down on U.S. banks
that do business with foreign banks that have neither a physical
presence in the United States, nor a connection to regulated
banks.96 Lawmakers may decide whether to enact the Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act or similar legislation as early as the 2009Legislators might also find it
2010 legislative session.97
politically difficult to oppose legislation that could raise billions
of dollars in government revenues by stymieing efforts geared

92. See Graham Bowley, From the Global Financial Crisis, A Push by Counties
to Repatriate Cash; Broad Political Trend Underlies UBS Decision to Release Clients’
Names, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 24, 2009, at 15 (noting that although the
settlement is a victory for the United States, “[t]he actual process of recovering the
names may become lost in bureaucracy and foot-dragging” and “smaller Swiss banks
. . . are confident that they can continue to profit by finding new ways to protect the
privacy of their clients . . . .”). But see Lynnley Browning, U.S. Indicts Two in
Switzerland on Tax Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2009, at B1 (highlighting that the
Justice Department’s indictment of Hansruedi Schmacher, a director at NZB Neue
Zurcher Bank of Zurich, and Matthias W. Rickenbach, a Swiss lawyer, for conspiring
to defraud the United States, signaled that Justice would pursue “smaller players”
including professionals who assist individual account holders).
93. STAFF OF S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 81 at 3.
94. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 681, 110th Cong. (2007).
95. See Govtrack.us: A Civic Project to Track Congress, H.R. 2136: Stop Tax
Haven Abuse Act, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-2136 (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009).
96. See LUCY KOMISAR, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK, CITIGROUP: A CULTURE AND
HISTORY OF TAX EVASION (2006), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/
Citigroup_-_a_culture_and_history_of_tax_evasion.pdf (discussing Citigroup’s long
history of using offshore shelters to help clients evade taxes).
97. See Jackie Calmes & Edmund L. Andrews, Obama Asks Curb on Use of
Havens to Reduce Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A1 (noting that the Obama
proposal riled powerful business interests).
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toward illegal tax evasion.98 “With the worsening U.S. budget
and deficit situation, increased pressure exists . . . to enhance
tax enforcement . . . against persons who intentionally deposit
income
in
offshore
jurisdictions”
making
“increased
international tax enforcement a likely priority that will receive
increased resources and political focus.”99 Passage of the Act
may be part of a concerted global effort to crack down on tax
havens that “play host to many non-regulated hedge funds that
were partly blamed for the global financial crisis.”100 After
governments bailed out banks to stave off the global financial
crisis, many politicians wonder why some financial institutions
are still conducting transactions in countries considered tax
havens.101 Finally, the fact that President Obama was one of
the sponsors of the 2007 Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act has fueled
speculation that the 2009 Act will pass.102
98. See Francis, supra note 33 (“If the nation’s economic woes continue,
lawmakers will probably have a more difficult time opposing legislation that could
raise billions . . . .”); see also Jay Krause & Christopher McLemore, Pennies from
Havens: Obama Pledges Crackdown on Offshore Banking Jurisdictions, WITHERS
LLP, Jan. 21, 2009, available at http://www.withersworldwide.com/newspublications/455/pennies-from-havens-obama-pledges-crackdown-on-offshorebanking-jurisdictions.aspx (explaining that President Obama has not indicated he
would back down from such a measure despite the sorry state of the economy;
highlighting that Congress recently enacted an exit tax on individuals who
expatriate, demonstrating a willingness to target this source of revenue; and noting
that such an Act might be useful in raising revenue to fund portions of the economic
stimulus package).
99. Bruce Zagaris, Swiss Government Reportedly Will Give U.S. Names of UBS
Depositors, 24 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Dec. 2008, at 12.
100. Tax Havens Face Blacklist Pressure—Global Financial Crisis, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Oct. 22, 2008, at 32.
101. French President Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, questioned, “Is it normal
that a bank to which we [France] guarantee loans or allocate our own funds
continues operating in tax havens?” President Sarkozy, answering his own question,
said, “The answer is no.” Id.; see also Lucia Kubosova, EU States Crack Down on
Tax Evasion, EUOBSERVER.COM, Oct. 22, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/26976
(“German finance minister Peer Steinbruck insisted . . . ‘Switzerland offers
conditions that prompt German taxpayers to evade taxes . . . .’”); Emma Thomasson
& Saeed Azhar, Offshore Under Scrutiny but Secrecy to Survive, HEDGEWORLD
DAILY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
WealthManagement08/idUSTRE49E41S20081015 (noting how the financial crisis
will increase the pressure on tax havens because government officials will have to
finance large rescue packages and politicians have “decided pursuing offshore
centers was politically popular.”).
102. See Gavin Hinks, US Launches New Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act: Senator
Carl Levin Proposes New Act Claiming Tax Havens Are Engaged in ‘Economic
AGE,
Mar.
4,
2009,
Warfare’
with
US,
ACCOUNTANCY
http://www.accountancyage.com/accountancyage/news/2237713/launches-stop-taxhaven-abuse (noting that speculation has begun that the Act will become law now
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When Sen. Levin offered testimony in support of the bill, he
cited “tax abuses that rob the U.S. treasury of an estimated
$100 billion each year, reward tax dodgers using offshore
secrecy laws to hide money . . . and offload the tax burden onto
the backs of middle income families” as the reasons why
Congress should pass the Act.103 According to Levin, the Act
would give the government “powerful tools to end offshore tax
haven . . . abuses” and that “[w]ith the financial crisis facing our
country today and the long list of expenses we’re incurring to try
to end that crisis . . . it is long past time for Congress to stop tax
cheats . . . .”104 Such motivation is understandable in light of
the fact that the United States has a national debt of greater
than $10 trillion105 and pays almost $500 billion annually in
interest on that debt.106 An objective observer, regardless of her
feelings about the fairness of the tax code, might have difficulty
siding with tax evaders rather than taxpayers.
Before
examining the tools the Act gives tax authorities to decrease the
incidence of tax evasion, it is useful to examine the current
methods by which the IRS enforces U.S. tax policy.
A. THE CURRENT METHODS OF TAX ENFORCEMENT
The IRS generally expects a U.S. taxpayer to voluntarily
report all of her income.107 Nevertheless, if a taxpayer conducts
a transaction within the United States, the IRS has methods to
procure some information regardless of taxpayer reporting. For
example, a U.S. payor or broker must report numerous types of
payments, e.g., interest, wages, dividends, and unemployment
compensation, to the IRS and the taxpayer.108 If the taxpayer
that previous bill sponsor Obama is president).
103. Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, supra note 76.
104. Press Release, Senator Carl Levin, supra note 76, at Part II.
105. Jackie Calmes, 2 Paths, but One Result: Bigger Deficits for U.S.; Analysts
Are Critical of Spending Plans; Elections 2008, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 30, 2008, at
6.
106. In fiscal year 2006, for example, the U.S. government spent $406 billion in
interest on the national debt. U.S. Dep’t of Treas. Bureau of the Pub. Debt. Interest
Expense on the Debt Outstanding, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/ir/
ir_expense.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2009).
107. See, e.g., Eileen Ambrose, Canceled Debt May Bring Big Tax Bill from IRS;
Amount Forgiven Counts as Income in Many Cases, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 2008, at C5
(highlighting that the IRS wants and expects people to pay taxes on their income on
a “pay-as-you-go basis,” including canceled debts worth less than $600 which
constitute “other income”).
108. See I.R.C. §§ 6042 (dividends), 6049 (interest), 6050B (unemployment
compensation), 6051 (wages) (2006).
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who receives this reported information fails to provide his
taxpayer identification number (TIN)109 to the payor or broker,
the IRS requires backup withholding of tax.110 The IRS may
examine relevant books and records to determine a taxpayer’s
liability and can summon the taxpayer or others to produce such
records or give testimony, on penalty of perjury, toward that
determination.111 For example, the IRS may summon a U.S.
bank to produce the banking information of an individual the
IRS suspects of underreporting her income.112 Lastly, U.S.
banks must report all suspicious banking transactions by filing
Suspicious Activity Reports and all currency transactions
exceeding $10,000 by filing Currency Transaction Reports.113
The IRS has access to these reports, can audit bank records, and
can sue to impose civil and/or criminal penalties on banks found
to be in violation of these reporting requirements.114
1. Foreign Enforcement is Difficult
In stark contrast to domestic reporting requirements, IRS
reporting obligations generally do not reach foreign payors or
Furthermore, to attract foreign clients, some
brokers.115
countries, e.g., Liechtenstein, Singapore, and Switzerland,
guarantee client confidentiality and account holdings secrecy.116
109. Under penalty of perjury, a U.S. citizen or resident must provide her name,
address, and TIN when opening a bank account at a domestic bank. ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV., Improving Access to Bank Information for Tax Purposes
Appendix I, ¶ 1.5.5.3.1 (2000) [hereinafter OECD BANK REPORT].
110. I.R.C. § 3406(a); see Blum, supra note 52, at 593 (identifying the means by
which the IRS can obtain tax information).
111. I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1)–(3); see also Blum, supra note 52, at 593.
112. See Blum, supra note 52, at 593–94 (explaining that U.S. District Courts
are “authorized to compel compliance with the summons and to use the contempt
power toward this end.”). Although the Right to Financial Privacy Act generally
safeguards individuals’ banking information, there are exceptions for enforcement of
I.R.C. provisions, for example, the administrative summons provided in I.R.C. §
7609. See Id. at n.49 (citing OECD BANK REPORT).
113. See Blum, supra note 52, at 594; see also OECD BANK REPORT, supra note
109, app. I, ¶ 1.4 (citing Reg. § 103.21–22).
114. OECD BANK REPORT, supra note 109, Appendix I, ¶ 1.6 (citing 31 U.S.C. §§
5531 and 5332); see also Blum, supra note 52, at 594 (explaining that the purpose of
such measures is to “protect against money-laundering as well as tax evasion”).
115. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1584–85 (2000) (explaining that
when neither “withholding at the source or information reporting . . . is
available . . . as in the case of foreign income, compliance rates drop dramatically.”).
116. See Greg Brabec, The Fight for Transparency: International Pressure to
Make Swiss Banking Procedures Less Restrictive, 21 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 231,
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In fact, in certain jurisdictions like the Bahamas, where taxes
are minimal to nonexistent,117 the governments may not collect
tax information from banks at all. Moreover, some countries
might not have the capacity to collect the sophisticated tax
information that U.S. tax authorities seek.118 Regardless of the
reason why tax information is unavailable, U.S. tax authorities’
requests for information directed to the executives or judiciaries
of such countries usually fall on deaf ears.119 Therefore, bank
secrecy jurisdictions have become attractive destinations for
illicitly earned monies, funds used for illicit purposes such as
money laundering or political corruption, or deposits meant to
evade U.S. income reporting requirements.120 Regardless of
whether the source or use of the funds is legitimate, offshore
secret accounts shield interest paid on monies held from U.S.
tax authorities, and the IRS might find it difficult, if not
impossible, to collect taxes based on these sources of funds.121
B. THE STOP TAX HAVEN ABUSE ACT’S TREATMENT OF TAX
HAVENS
The Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act initially identifies thirtyfour offshore secrecy jurisdictions.122 Most of these jurisdictions
are small and some are very small. Anguilla, for example, has a
landmass of only ninety-one square kilometers, or about half the
size of Washington D.C., and a population numbering 14,436.123
232 (2007) (noting that the Swiss take pride in a “highly secure banking system” and
have historically touted their banks as places where account holders’ identities and
holdings are kept secret).
117. See Gibson, supra note 54.
118. Some developing countries do not have the means to collect tax revenues.
It makes sense that countries incapable of collecting taxes would also lack the ability
to collect sophisticated tax information. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt,
Introduction to Tax Policy Design and Development 6 (Apr. 2003) (unpublished draft
prepared for a course on Practical Issues of Tax Policy in Developing Countries,
World Bank, April 28-May 1, 2003), http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/
LearningProgram/PracticalIssues/papers/introduction%20to%20tax%20policy/WBI%
20Module%201(Bird&Zolt)April10.doc (“[G]enerally, the capacity of countries to
collect taxes appears to rise as income levels increase.”).
119. See Blum, supra note 52, at 595 (noting that some governments impose
penalties on employees who break bank secrecy laws, and that other countries do
not have tax treaties with the United States to facilitate information exchange).
120. Id. at 596.
121. See id. at 596 (noting that even if the source of the funds is legitimate, “it
may be impossible for the IRS . . . to collect debts against these assets.”).
122. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. § 101(b) (2009). The
list is based on IRS court filings. GRAVELLE, supra note 19, at 3.
123. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK (2008), available at
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Some of these jurisdictions are relatively rich, such as the
Channel Islands (Jersey, Guernsey, Sark, and Alderney),124
while others are relatively poor.125 Regardless of their economic
status, most of these countries are small in terms of both land
and population size, and weak in the arena of international
affairs.126 In other words, they make easy targets.
1. Defining a Tax Haven
The first step to stopping tax haven abuse is to identify tax
havens. According to the Act, the term “offshore secrecy
jurisdiction” means “any foreign jurisdiction . . . listed by the
Secretary [of the Treasury] as an offshore secrecy
jurisdiction.”127 Under the Act, the Secretary determines which
jurisdictions are offshore secrecy jurisdictions based on the
existence of tax secrecy laws that “unreasonably restrict the
ability of the United States to obtain information relevant to the
enforcement [of the Act], unless the Secretary also determines
that such country has effective information exchange
practices.”128
The Act defines secrecy or confidentiality rules and
practices as “both formal laws and regulations and informal
government or business practices” that inhibit “access of law
enforcement and tax administration authorities to beneficial
ownership and other financial information.”129 To determine
which countries have ineffective information exchange practices,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/av.html. According
to the CIA, per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in 2004 was US$8,800.
Anguilla’s GDP at purchasing power parity in 2004 was US$108.9 million. Id.
124. Jersey is an island in the English Channel, northwest of France. According
to the CIA, per capita GDP at purchasing power parity in 2005 was US$57,000. Id.
at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/je.html.
125. Although Vanuatu is not one of the poorest places in the world, 70% of its
population makes its living by subsistence farming. According to the CIA, per capita
GDP at purchasing power parity in 2007 was US$4400. Id. at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nh.html.
126. See generally Michael Isaacson, The Tax Haven the OECD Forgot? Harmful
Tax Competition? Harmful to Whom? Learn About the Real Agenda Behind OECD’s
Blacklists of Offshore Tax Havens, http://www.offshore-fox.com/offshorecorporations/offshore_corporations_0401.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (explaining
how politicians target foreign jurisdictions because domestic tax hikes at home are
politically unpopular).
127. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. § 101(b) (2009) (amending
76 U.S.C. § 7701(a)).
128. Id.
129. Id.
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the Act authorizes the Secretary, on an annual basis, to classify
any jurisdiction as an offshore secrecy jurisdiction unless the
country: (i) has a treaty or some type of information exchange
agreement with the United States; (ii) the exchange of
information was adequate in terms of preventing tax evasion or
avoidance of U.S. income tax during the 12-month period of
review prior to the annual determination; and (iii) such
jurisdiction, during the 12-month review period, “was not
identified by an intergovernmental group or organization of
which the United States is a member as uncooperative with
international tax enforcement . . . .”130 Finally, the Secretary
has the authority to add or remove a jurisdiction from the initial
list based on whether or not they improve their exchange-ofinformation practices.131
2. Ambiguous Definitions
The Act’s definition of “tax haven” is ambiguous.132 While
there are standards by which the Secretary must make a
determination, there are few concrete criteria by which to make
For example, whether a country has an
that finding.133
established tax treaty with the United States is a verifiable
criterion. Whether a jurisdiction has rules or practices that
unreasonably restrict U.S. access to tax information, however,
lies in the eye of the beholder.134 It is plausible to argue that

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Much of the legal criticism of the Act has focused on the patenting of tax
strategies and the implications of the Act for lawyers’ professional responsibilities.
See, e.g., Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents, Taxes, and the Nuclear Option: Do We
Need a “Tax Strategy Patent” Ban Treaty?, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1 (2008);
Nicholas Robinson, Patenting the Tax Code: Monopolizing Basic Tax Strategy, 5
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 50 (2007); Craig E. Groeschel, Comment, Tax Strategy
Patents Considered Harmful, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 271 (2008); Stephanie L.
Varela, Note, Damned If You Do, Doomed If You Don’t: Patenting Legal Methods and
Its Effect on Lawyers’ Professional Responsibilities, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1145 (2008).
Instead, I focus on the lack of clarity and equity in the Act’s treatment of tax havens.
133. See Krause & McLemore, supra note 98 (noting the criticism that the initial
list of jurisdictions does not differentiate between jurisdictions that do conform to
widely accepted international standards, i.e., countries that have recently penned
TIEAs with the United States, and those that have not).
134. See Rawlings, supra note 53, at 3 (“The principles . . . devised by
multilateral organisations and offshore financial authorities are subject to divergent
interpretations between regulators and regulatees. It is social actors – lawyers,
accountants, fund managers, tax compliance regulators – who frame these contests,
through their daily deeds and narrated reflections on their practices.”).
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the mere existence of tax secrecy rules is an objective factor. In
that case, Switzerland, famous for its bank secrecy laws,135 is an
obvious choice for the list and does appear as a listed offshore
secrecy jurisdiction.136 Whether those rules “unreasonably
restrict the ability of the United States to obtain information
relevant to . . . enforcement,”137 however, is another matter.
The Act does not define what constitutes a reasonable
restriction on the exchange of tax information. In that way, it
seems discretionary—one might say arbitrary—whether the
Secretary believes a country’s bank secrecy provisions unduly
restrict U.S. tax authorities’ ability to obtain the necessary tax
information. Additionally, it is unclear how the Secretary would
determine whether the bank secrecy laws or some other factor
prevented U.S. tax authorities from making use of relevant
information to enforce U.S. income tax. For example, Swiss
bank UBS told Senate investigators that approximately 20,000
U.S. clients have about $18 billion in deposits in UBS
Switzerland.138 In the summer of 2008, a federal court granted
the IRS permission to pierce Swiss bank secrecy laws and
demand the identities of 19,000 American clients who “failed to
disclose their Swiss-based accounts on U.S. tax returns.”139 If
UBS readily defied Swiss bank secrecy laws, did those tax
secrecy rules unreasonably restrict IRS access to relevant tax
information? Assume UBS agreed to circumvent Swiss bank
secrecy laws contingent on a U.S. federal court granting the IRS
permission to attempt to pierce bank secrecy laws.140 If the
federal court had not granted the IRS leave to seek the
identities of U.S. citizens with accounts in UBS, was it the
Swiss tax secrecy laws or the federal court order that restricted
U.S. tax authority access to the necessary tax information?
Assume that UBS disclosed the identities of the 19,000
individuals who failed to comply with the U.S. reporting
requirement, but that the IRS could not handle that volume of
tax evaders.141 Under the Act, this might be a sufficient reason
135. See Brabec, supra note 116, at 231; Hilzenrath, supra note 7.
136. See Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. §101(a)(1) (2009).
137. Id.
138. Hilzenrath, supra note 7, at D3.
139. Id. at D3.
140. See Evan Perez, Guilty Plea by Ex-Banker Likely to Aid Probe of UBS,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2008, at C1 (stating that prosecutors in the Birkenfield case
sought to delay sentencing while they attempted to use Birkenfield’s knowledge to
“pierce the centuries-old secrecy for which UBS and other Swiss banks are known.”).
141. Martin Lobel, Chairman of the Tax Analysts Information Service, argued

DO NOT DELETE

266

11/19/2009 9:37 AM

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW

[Vol. 19:1

to label a foreign jurisdiction a tax secrecy haven.
3. Who the Act Does Not Include—Countries Operating
Preferential Tax Regimes
Some jurisdictions not on the Act’s initial list, such as the
United States, have higher than nominal income taxes, but
exempt some forms of income from those taxes as part of a
preferential tax regime.142 In fact, “no major capital-importing
country has been able to impose such a tax [on interest paid to
foreigners] for fear of driving mobile capital elsewhere. . . .”143
For that reason, most countries are tax havens. That is,
individuals intentionally route transactions through foreign
countries because of the savings earned by avoiding taxes on
In practice, this means that the Act cannot
interest.144
completely solve the erosion of the U.S. tax base because it only
targets countries with bank secrecy laws, rather than countries
that operate preferential tax regimes. Because the Act would
subject jurisdictions on the list to heightened scrutiny and
potential sanctions, it seems hypocritical and inequitable to
target tax secrecy jurisdictions, and not countries that operate
successful tax preferential regimes.145 Such hypocrisy could
weaken foreign actors’ resolve to comply.146 The absence of
that the IRS could not handle that many tax evaders. A former federal prosecutor
turned tax defense specialist, Edward M. Robbins Jr., countered that the Justice
Department, separate from the civil lawyers working for the IRS, could handle such
a caseload. See Hilzenrath, supra note 7, at D01.
142. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 115, at 1576. As of 1984, the United States
exempts taxes on interest paid to non-residents.
143. Id. at 1576.
144. See Littlewood, supra note 59, at 460 (“individuals and firms routinely
conduct transactions through such jurisdictions for no other purpose than to escape
taxes . . . .”).
145. For example, China operates a very successful tax preferential regime. See
Tola Adewola, China Approves Bill to End Preferential Tax Treatment for Foreign
BUS.
L.J.,
(March
27,
2007),
available
at
Companies,
ILL.
http://iblsjournal.typepad.com/illinois_business_law_soc/2007/03/will_chinas_
new.html. Domestic Chinese companies pay a statutory income tax rate of 33%, but
foreign companies, such as foreign service companies, qualify for preferential rates
of income tax of 15% or 24%. China enacted a new enterprise income tax law (EIT),
effective January 1, 2008, that largely ended preferential tax treatment for foreign
companies operating in China.
Significantly, however, two categories of
companies—foreign high-tech and other important industries, and foreign
companies with small profits—still pay preferential income taxes. Id.
146. See generally Shelter Offshore, In Support of Offshore Tax Havens, Nov. 3,
2008, http://www.shelteroffshore.com/index.php/offshore/more/in-support-of-offshoretax-havens-10147/ (arguing that entities like the OECD and U.N. “make veiled
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countries operating preferential tax regimes from the Act’s
initial list makes sense politically. It is much easier to take on
the likes of Vanuatu than China.147
4. Musical Havens—The “Shift” Argument
Because of the inherent lag in listing countries as offshore
secrecy jurisdictions—the Act specifies a 12-month period
preceding the annual determination—the Act is more likely to
shift tax evasion to untargeted tax havens rather than eliminate
targeted jurisdictions. A country not on the initial list, Liberia
for example,148 might advertise itself as protecting account
holders’ identities and holding amounts by offering client
confidentiality guarantees. During the 12-month lag period,
that country is likely to win business that might otherwise have
gone to targeted foreign secrecy jurisdictions.149 This argument
may seem like a stretch because the burden of transferring
funds or transfer-driven scrutiny would deter shifting funds in
the manner described.150 However, in an era in which it is
easier than ever to transfer funds from one jurisdiction to
another, unless all tax havens cease to exist at once, the specter
of musical havens is a real one.151
claims” that tax shelters are corrupt, “yet, there is so much hypocrisy in what many
of these entities and bodies say and actually do . . . .”).
147. In 2000, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs requested each OECDmember country to self-identify aspects of its tax regime that would constitute a
preferential tax regime according to OECD standards for such a regime. The
results, perhaps not surprisingly, showed that Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the
United States all operated a preferential tax regime. OECD, 2000, supra note 59, ¶
5, 11; Littlewood, supra note 59, at 428. From this OECD list, generated in 2000,
only Switzerland and Luxembourg appear on the Act’s initial list of foreign secrecy
jurisdictions. Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506, 111th Cong. § 101(b) (2009). As
long as countries continue to maintain preferential tax regimes, the absence of those
countries from the Act guarantees that the U.S. tax base will continue to erode.
148. In 2000, the OECD identified Liberia as a tax haven. OECD, 2000, supra
note 59, ¶ 17.
149. See Littlewood, supra note 59, at 463 (noting that if one tax haven is
eliminated, “the surviving havens will win business that would have gone through
those havens that have been shut down.”).
150. See Nick Cohen, At Least Germany Stamps on Tax Havens, OBSERVER, Feb.
24, 2008, at Comment & Debate, 38, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/
commentisfree/2008/feb/24/germany.globaleconomy (noting the increasing global
focus in cracking down on tax havens).
151. See David Cay Johnston, Musical Chairs on Tax Havens: Now It’s Ireland,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at C1 (highlighting companies that shifted funds to tax-
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5. Failing to Account for Other Countries’ Interests
The Act will fail to eliminate tax havens for the simple
reason that it fails to account for other nations’ interests. In
terms of taxation, putting U.S. citizens first might not be
objectionable.152 Consider, however, the reasons why a country
might enact strict bank secrecy laws or allow transactions that
other countries’ tax authorities would consider objectionable or
suspicious. One underlying rationale is survival. For example,
Nauru, a small island in the South Pacific Ocean, has a total
area of 21.3 square kilometers (8.2 square miles), and is the
Rich phosphate
world’s smallest independent republic.153
deposits are the country’s main economic resource, but because
of mining and the depletion of this resource, the country’s per
capita GDP is declining.154 Given the country’s size and
declining resources, one incentive to operate as an offshore
secrecy jurisdiction might be the lack of available alternatives
for economic growth.155 Even countries that do have available
alternatives, Singapore for example, lack an economic incentive
to comply with the U.S. law.156 Singapore has said it will not
budge, despite pressure to undo its strict bank secrecy
provisions, presumably because those provisions are precisely
friendly Ireland following legislative crackdowns on Bermuda).
152. See Graetz, supra note 44, at 1371–72 (explaining that historically, “the
power to tax is rarely delegated to multinational organizations,” and “we [U.S.
citizens] regard our obligation for the well-being of our fellow citizens as more
pressing than for people in need elsewhere in the world.”). But see Allison
Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. INT’L LAW 99, 99
(“[T]his view of sovereign autonomy over taxation is increasingly inconsistent with .
. . . global economic reality. . . . Major theoretical developments in tax policy are now
arising not through solely national political and legal processes but through the
interactions of nongovernmental actors in transnational settings.”).
153. REPUBLIC OF NAURU: PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
NAURU COUNTRY PROFILE, http://www.un.int/nauru/countryprofile.html (last visited
Oct. 2, 2009).
154. See UNITED NATIONS, NAURU, http://www.un.int/nauru/nauru.pdf (last
visited Oct. 2, 2009).
155. See Anthony B. van Fossen, Money Laundering, Global Financial
Instability, and Tax Havens in the Pacific Islands, CONTEMP. PAC., Fall 2003, at 237
(explaining that multilateral attempts to exclude Pacific Islands from the
international financial system has those jurisdictions “battling for their survival”).
One can surmise that those countries would not risk such severe consequences
without equally strong motivations.
156. See Yesim Yilmaz, Tax Havens, Tax Competition and Economic
Performance, 6 PROSPERITAS issue III (2006), at 1 n.2, available at
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/Papers/taxhavens/taxhavens.pdf (noting how
countries like Singapore are in direct competition with the United States for
investment from the United States and other countries).
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what lure international financial investors.157 The Boston
Consulting Group predicted offshore assets will reach $8.8
trillion by 2012, giving foreign banks a strong financial
incentive not to cooperate with U.S. tax authorities.158
IV. ALTERNATIVES THAT CONSIDER OTHER
COUNTRIES’ INTERESTS
The problem is not that the Act puts U.S. interests first.159
Rather, the problem is that although the United States is
dependent on other countries for tax information in order for the
IRS to enforce U.S. tax policies,160 the Act does not consider
other countries’ interests in promoting bank secrecy.161 The
U.S. motivation is obvious.
When other countries hold
themselves out as tax shelters and guarantee bank secrecy, U.S.
taxpayers cheat on their tax returns.162 This decreases the U.S.
tax base by depleting financial resources that the government
can use to support its initiatives.163
Motivation for a country like Nauru is relatively simple as
well. Because Nauru’s resources are declining, one source of
economic security is the foreign investment attracted by the
country’s bank secrecy laws.164 Alternatives that consider
others’ economic interests—while not necessarily requiring the
subordination of U.S. interests—are a policy that trades cash for
tax information and an international tax organization with
domestic enforcement powers.

157. See Thomasson & Azhar, supra note 101, at 1 (“Singapore says it will not
budge on its tough bank secrecy laws despite EU demands . . . .”).
158. See Thomasson & Azhar, supra note 101, at 1 (“The Boston Consulting
Group has forecast total offshore assets under management will climb to $8.8 trillion
by 2012 from $7.3 trillion in 2007 . . . .”).
159. See Graetz, supra note 44, at 1371–72 (arguing that it is natural, both
historically and politically, for policy makers to give primacy to U.S. citizens’
interests in national policy, including tax policy).
160. See Tillinghast, supra note 25, at 39.
161. See supra Part III.B.5.
162. See David Cay Johnston, Tax Cheats Called Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 2006, at C1 (giving examples of U.S. citizens who cheat on their taxes, such
as Robert Wood Johnson IV, the owner of the New York Jets, and Charles and Sam
Wyly, founders of the Center for Public Integrity).
163. See id. (proving examples of what governments might use tax revenues for,
e.g., infrastructure or providing for the needy).
164. See Van Fossen, supra note 155, at 237.
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A. CASH FOR TAX INFORMATION
If the United States were to purchase tax information, the
goal would not be to collect as much information as possible, but
to collect only the smallest amount of information necessary to
enforce tax laws.165 Once the United States identified a
jurisdiction from which it needed tax information, that
jurisdiction’s willingness and ability to provide the necessary
tax information would become an issue of price negotiation.166
The final price might include compensation necessary to repay
private parties and “to offset the burdens imposed” on foreign
governmental actors.167 This market system of tax information
acquisition takes into account another country’s non-reciprocal
need for tax information or its inability to gather such
information. If the U.S. paid less for such information than the
amount of tax revenue that information would produce, the
system would account for all parties’ interests. By doing so, a
net importer of tax information, such as the United States, could
acquire extraterritorial tax information from a country with
relatively small amounts of collected tax information, such as
the Bahamas.168
The current method of bilateral exchange—trading tax
information for tax information—remains fundamentally
unchanged since before World War II and is outdated.169 Rather
than using sanctions to force countries into compliance as the
Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act would do, the United States might
allow the use of cash as consideration for specific tax
information.170 This would allow an importer of tax information
165. The IRS has previously limited the amount of tax information collected.
See Dorothy A. Brown, Race and Class Matters in Tax Policy, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
790, 807 (2007) (noting the end of IRS “general audits” according to the Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program).
166. See Dean, supra note 9, at 659 (“[T]he United States could negotiate with
the governments of those jurisdictions the specific nature of the information . . . as
well as regarding the price at which it would be willing and able to provide it.”).
167. See id. at 659–60.
168. See id. at 611 (noting that a more complete market would allow a country to
“maximize its utility and to minimize its impact on privacy” even if they collected
little or no information.”); see also Gibson, supra note 54 (stating that the Bahamas
does not levy taxes on “capital gains, corporate earnings, personal income, sales,
inheritance, or dividends.”).
169. See Dean, supra note 9, at 611 (highlighting for example, that net tax
information importers, such as the United States, could acquire specific tax
information, rather than import homogenized information en masse, which is less
useful and more invasive).
170. See Dean, supra note 9, at 611.
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to acquire tax information ex post, thereby decreasing the
privacy concerns associated with the shipment of tax data.171
However, the possibility of market failure still exists in this
cash-for-information system. For example, the fair price for
information might exceed the revenues generated by the
acquisition of information or a bilateral monopoly might prevent
a more complete market.172 Even though a purchaser of tax
information would acquire tailored information making privacy
less of a concern, a nonmarket solution might provide more
robust privacy protections than a market alternative.173 A
governmental alternative might avoid market failures.
B. A NEW MULTILATERAL INSTITUTION
Because leaders have political and financial incentives to
act in nationally self-interested ways, a transnational body with
domestic tax authority could overcome the problem of
Such a
extraterritorial tax information acquisition.174
transnational actor would need to have powers on par with the
domestic capabilities of national tax authorities, which would
impinge on traditional notions of national sovereignty.175
171. With the increasing advent of identity theft and hackers, the case for
limiting the information sent to the IRS is strong. See ROBERT F. DACEY,
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TECHNOLOGY, INFORMATION POLICY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AND THE
CENSUS: INFORMATION SECURITY: PROGRESS MADE, BUT WEAKNESSES AT THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CONTINUE TO POSE RISKS (2003), reprinted in TAX
ANALYSTS, 2003 TAX NOTES TODAY 106-12 at 6–7 (2003); see generally Peter P.
Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government Surveillance, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 497 (1999) (“The possibility of intrusions . . . is a powerful
argument against allowing unlimited government access to sensitive personal
information of any kind.”). There is also the risk that an IRS employee might
conduct an unauthorized search of an individual’s tax information. See Andrea
Coombes, IRS Employee Sentenced for Snooping: Tax Man Eyes Tax Records of
Almost 200 Celebrities, Including Kevin Bacon, MARKETWATCH, Aug. 20, 2008,
http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/irs-worker-snooped-tax-records/
story.aspx?guid={786BACBD-C58F-481B-AE31-28C2101E7CF6}&dist=msr_1.
172. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.8, at 62 (6th ed.
2003) (noting that a bilateral monopoly occurs and causes high transaction costs
when neither party has a beneficial alternative to “dealing with the other”).
173. See generally Peter P. Swire, Trustwrap: The Importance of Legal Rules to
Electronic Commerce and Internet Privacy, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 847, 860–73 (2003)
(discussing the importance of privacy protection in the Internet era).
174. See, e.g., Vito Tanzi, Globalization and the Work of Fiscal Termites, 38 FIN.
& DEV. 1, Mar. 1, 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/03/tanzi.htm
(noting the distant, and more utopian, possibility of a world tax organization that
would facilitate the international collection and distribution of tax revenues).
175. See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State
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Recently, two existing international organizations, the United
Nations and the OECD, have vied for leadership of a new global
tax authority.176 Both the United Nations and the OECD are
capitalizing on their history of work aimed at increasing
international tax cooperation.177 In theory, either organization
could fill the gaps generated by the current patchwork system of
bilateral tax treaties and avoid the inequity of the multilateral
conventions on tax information acquisition.
In practice,
however, the reality is much different.
The OECD’s exclusive membership fuels non-members’
perceptions of discrimination in the development of
international tax rules.178 This generates a perception of
illegitimacy whereby large powerful countries dominate smaller,
weaker ones in the realm of tax policy and enforcement.179
Although the OECD might have more power than the United
Nations to enforce an international tax regime, it lacks the
necessary international legitimacy because of its membership
makeup, which includes historically powerful nations, such as
the United States, France, Germany, Portugal, Spain, Italy,
Japan, and the United Kingdom.180 While the United Nations
might have greater international credibility as a fair arbiter of
Sovereignty, 56 INT’L ORG. 151, 173 (2002) (noting that such an organization might
spell the end of the traditional Westphalian system of sovereignty).
176. Dean, supra note 9, at 661–62.
177. See, e.g., U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, U.N. Model Double
Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. No.
ST/ESA/102 (1980), reprinted in STANLEY S. SURREY, United Nations Model
Convention for Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries: A
Description and Analysis, in 5 HARV. L.SCH. INT’L TAX PROGRAM & INT’L BUREAU OF
FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, SELECTED MONOGRAPHS ON TAXATION 87-113 (1980).
178. See Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal “World Tax
Organization” Through National Responses to E-Commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE
J.L. & TECH. 136, 185–86 (2006) (arguing that extending OECD membership to
different countries will “help to allay concerns that the OECD has been ‘captured’ by
multinational firms based in OECD countries” and noting that “the perceived
influence of these firms may be reducing the legitimacy and effectiveness of OECD
reform efforts.”); Littlewood, supra note 59, at 480–85 (describing pitfalls to OECD
reform efforts, including the fact that the membership is not viewed as
representative of the entire world).
179. See Alexander Townsend, Jr., Comment, The Global Schoolyard Bully: The
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development’s Coercive Efforts to
Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 215, 251–58 (2001) (arguing that
the 1998 and 2000 OECD reports “mark a coercive and intrusive solution that
deviates from traditional fiscal remedies.”).
180. Dean, supra note 9, at n.370; see also Littlewood, supra note 59, at 480–85.
For a list of OECD member nations, see Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.,
Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, http://www.sb05.com/OECDJ.html (last
visited Nov. 2, 2009).
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international tax controversies,181 it lacks sufficient power to be
a transnational tax enforcer.182 Countries, especially the United
States, might resist the necessary curtailment of sovereignty for
international tax enforcement.183 Realizing its incentives to
resist U.N. enforcement authority, the United States might
recognize other countries’ similar incentives to work against the
successful enforcement of a U.S. dominated multilateral tax
regime such as the OECD. Thus, tax evasion is a global
problem requiring a global solution.184
V. CONCLUSION
Globalization, the September 11th attacks, and two recent
scandals have put tax havens in the legislative crosshairs. The
Obama Administration fully supports the Stop Tax Haven
Because of President Obama’s unqualified
Abuse Act.185
support, the political popularity of cracking down on tax evaders
in tough economic times, and banks’ decreasing ability to fight
against such measures, the Act is likely to pass.
The
centerpiece of the Act is a list of offshore secrecy jurisdictions.
Although some of the motives behind enacting such legislation
are laudable and some of the Act’s provisions are commendable,
the Act is unlikely to garner cooperation from countries vital to
its success. The Act fails to account for other countries’
economic interests. Although alternatives are not perfect, they
are preferable. A market solution, such as allowing the United
181. See U.N. Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters,
Institutional Framework for International Tax Cooperation, ¶¶ 5–10, at 4–5, U.N.
Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/2003/L.6 (Aug. 19, 2003), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/LTD/NO3/481/35/PDF/NO348135.pdf?OpenElement (“The United Nations
has recognized for some time the need to give the developing and transitional
countries a voice in the formulation of international tax norms.”).
182. See Oona A. Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory
of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 506 (2005) (noting the weakness of the
United Nations’ ability to enforce compliance).
183. See, e.g., Daniel Mitchell, U.N. Tax Police Potential, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2002, at A18 (expressing concern that a U.N.-led international tax organization
would be costly to the United States).
184. See Palan, supra note 175, at 173 (“[A]ny serious attempt to combat the tax
havens phenomenon would have to be conducted on a multilateral level.”); see also
MICHIEL VAN DIJK & FRANCIS WEYZIG, THE GLOBAL PROBLEM OF TAX HAVENS: THE
CASE OF THE NETHERLANDS 3 (Stichting Onderzoek Multinationale Ondernemingen
[Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations] 2008) (2007) (arguing that the
Netherlands must end harmful tax policies but that the tax haven problem requires
a global solution).
185. Drawbaugh & Daly, supra note 3.
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States to purchase tax information from other countries, or an
intergovernmental solution, such as a World Tax Organization,
would facilitate a greater exchange of extraterritorial tax
information and bolster the enforcement of U.S. tax laws.

